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In December 1999, the Boards of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
approved a new approach to their relations with low-income countries.  The approach was 
centered around the development and implementation of Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS), 
which are intended to be country-driven, and medium- to long-term in perspective, 
comprehensive and results-oriented partnership-oriented, and built on broad-based participation.  
Against this tall order of business, experience to date has been varied, and much debate is 
ongoing on whether the approach can be considered more than “old wine in new bottles”.   
This paper—based on the results of a thorough review of the five-year implementation 
experience—examines the implementation of the PRS approach from the point of view of 
participation and accountability.  For some 50 countries adopting the approach since 1999, it 
discusses the factors which can facilitate the development of accountability and participatory 
governance mechanisms.  Lessons learned from distinct country circumstances are analyzed, 
arguing that ownership of the PRS depends on the way countries and their external donor 
partners handle real tensions in the relationship between country ownership on the one hand, and 
perceptions of internationally-driven prescriptions on the other.   
The central message of the paper is that in several countries the PRS initiative has helped 
open up societies to forms of dialogue and contestability not previously experienced in-country 
or observed by external partners. This positive outcome, however, has been largely influenced by 
the extent to which the PRS process has reinforced existing trends and strengthened institutions 
already prone to open discussion of policy choices.  The paper also shows that even in the best 
cases change has, to date, been largely in the area of process and that impact of participatory 
governance on policy-making, while emerging, is still a work in progress. The paper concludes 
with recommendations for how developing country societies might sustain real achievements in 
participatory governance/domestic accountability going forward, with external partners playing a 
key supportive role through harmonization and alignment.   3
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Strengthening Governance through Engaged Societies 
Lessons from the Implementation of Poverty Reduction Strategies 
“Transparency and information are not enough. Opening up the dark chambers of the state to the eyes of 
the public is a major move forward, but it is only a first step. Governments cannot expect information 
provision to single handedly and spontaneously generate positive feedback loops between state and 
society. Governments need to be encouraged to directly stimulate the participation of society and to 




In December 1999, the Boards of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund approved 
a new approach to their relations with low-income countries.  The approach was to be centered 
around the development and implementation of poverty reduction strategies (PRSs), intended to 
be country-driven and medium- to long-term in perspective, comprehensive and results-oriented, 
partnership-oriented, and built on broad-based participation.  The successful preparation of a 
nationally owned poverty reduction strategy became a precondition for access to debt relief and 
concessional financing from both institutions. Strategies were also expected to serve as a 
framework for better coordination of development assistance among other development partners.  
 
The adoption of the PRS approach is best seen in the context of the decade-long change in the 
approach to development lending by the World Bank and other international finance institutions 
IFIs, stimulated by a large body of research on development effectiveness
3, and by associated 
changes in the “authorizing environment” surrounding the Bank and the IMF.  All these factors 
have increasingly emphasized the role of good governance and institutions for effective 
development, and of “ownership” by governments (and societies) as a precondition for 
successful reforms.  The increased emphasis on country ownership led to changes in several 
aspects of Bank operations, from project design to strategic approaches.  It finally resulted in the 
changes to the architecture of the relationship between IFIs and client countries, with the stated 
objective of “putting the country in the driver seat”. 
 
As of the end of the year 2005, about 50 countries have subscribed to different extents to the 
PRS approach, and some 20 more are at different stages in the process of elaboration of a 
strategy.  Thus, it is fair to say that the PRS has now become a world-wide feature of the way in 
which policies are elaborated and discussed in low-income countries, particularly in Africa.  
Given the emphasis on participatory approaches in elaboration, execution and monitoring of the 
poverty strategy emphasized by the international community, a question comes naturally to 
mind, namely, is there evidence that the adoption of the PRS has led to changes in the ways in 
                                                 
2 Ackerman, John M. , Social Accountability in the Public Sector – A Conceptual Discussion, Social Development 
Paper no. 82, March 2005. Ch.5. p. 38. 
3 A few of the most influential Bank reports include:  The State in a Changing World (World Development Report 
1997), Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank (the Bank’s anticorruption strategy, 
1997); Assessing Aid: What Works What Doesn’t and Why (Policy Research Report 1999); Attacking Poverty 
(World Development Report 2001, and finally, Building Institutions for Markets (World Development Report 2002). 
All of these reports stressed the critical importance of well-functioning and accountable public institutions to 
economic growth and poverty reduction.   5
which societies in the relevant countries interact with each other, and in particular, whether the 
systems of accountability have been strengthened by the adoption of the process? 
 
This paper aims to provide some elements that are necessary to come to a judgment on this 
important question, with the obvious caveat that the relatively short time span of the 
implementation of the PRS process makes it very difficult to assess the magnitude and 
sustainability of changes in power relations that may require decades, if not generations, to take 
hold. 
 
In the first section of this paper, we briefly review experience with the PRS process, and provide 
a summary of several recent assessments of its effectiveness.  Section II provides a broad-
spectrum background of the features of the system of governance of the countries that have 
undertaken the PRS process, and reviews the evidence of participation and its effects, adopting a 
framework to categorize the different country experiences.  Section III discusses the evolution of 
several indicators of the quality of governance that can be helpful in assessing the effects of the 
participation experience in PRS countries.  Finally, section IV provides a few suggestions on 
how to move forward. 
 
I - Poverty Reduction Strategies and Participation: Background and Critiques 
I.A Background 
 
In 1996, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) launched the Debt 
Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), which created a framework for all 
creditors, including multilateral creditors, to provide debt relief to the world's poorest and most 
heavily indebted countries, and thereby reduce the constraint on economic growth and poverty 
reduction imposed by the debt build-up in these countries.  Early implementation experience then 
prompted the Bank and IMF to (i) enhance the HIPC Initiative in order to provide deeper, 
broader and faster relief, and (ii) strengthen the links between debt relief and poverty reduction.  
To articulate the second of these goals, the Bank and IMF formally launched a new approach in 
December 1999 which was centered on the development and implementation of poverty 
reduction strategies (PRSs).  PRSs marked a new departure in the Bank and IMF relationships 
with low-income countries, because the successful preparation of a nationally-owned poverty 
reduction strategy became a precondition for access to debt relief and concessional financing 
from both institutions. PRSs were expected to be poverty-focused, country-driven, results-
oriented, and comprehensive, and were designed to serve as a framework for better coordination 
of development assistance among other development partners. 
  
As of end-2005, 49 countries have prepared PRSs. Just over half of these are in sub-Saharan 
Africa; and a similar proportion are HIPC countries. Thirty of these countries have also produced 
at least one annual progress report. Countries have been implementing their strategies, on 
average, for just under three years. Several countries are in the process of revising their original 
strategies, and Burkina Faso, Tanzania, and Uganda have already done so. Eleven more countries 
have produced interim strategies, and ten have initiated processes that could result in a PRS.     6
As we will discuss later, it is fair to say that after five full years of implementation, the PRS 
approach has helped put poverty reduction at the center of the public policy debate, highlighted 
the need to identify and address country-specific constraints to more effective development, 
heightened awareness of the need for sound analysis to underpin policy choices, and reinforced 
the incentives to monitor the results of public actions.   For most countries, however, the 
experience of the last five years shows that the implementation of a PRS requires a sustained, 
long-term commitment and the purposive management of expectations. Besides managing a 
complex policy dialogue with a wide range of stakeholders, low-income country governments 
have to put together an integrated medium-term development and poverty reduction strategy, 
complete with short- and long-term goals and monitoring systems. Few industrial countries could 
systematically do this well. Moreover, these tasks must be managed with limited technical and 
institutional capacity and in ways that reinforce—rather than undermine— national institutions, 
processes, and governance systems.  
  
1.B Recent reviews of the PRS experience 
 
Given its growing importance, the PRS process has been extensively reviewed by a number of 
stakeholders as well as by IFIs themselves.
4   Three relatively recent reports offer interesting 
insights on the workings of the PRS process and on participation in particular. 
 
In 2004 the Operations Evaluation Department of the World Bank and the Office of the 
Independent Evaluator of the IMF undertook independent reviews of the IFI’s support to the PRS 
initiative through the end of 2003, reaching similar conclusions.
5  The major thesis of the OED 
study, for instance, is that: 
 
“The Initiative’s contribution so far has varied widely across countries, depending mainly on the 
initial conditions in each country’s public sector capacity, government-partner relationships, and 
relations among donors.  The Initiative has added the most value in countries where government 
leadership and aid management processes were already strong.  It has had less effect in countries 
with weak public sector capacity or with donor-dominated aid relationships.  Because the 
Initiative includes a uniform requirement—completion of an acceptable document—it has not 
been sufficiently tailored to match the full range of capabilities and public policy priorities found 
in low-income countries.”    
       
It is important to note, however, that at the time of the evaluation, the PRS of none of the ten 
countries included in the case studies had been under implementation for more than 2.6 years and 
the average was 1.4 years.  While this allowed for an analysis of the process, it meant that for the 
most part the effects could not be analyzed in a meaningful way.  Given this limitation it is not 
surprising that the most value was added “in countries where government leadership and aid 
management processes were already strong.”  
                                                 
4 A comprehensive bibliographical reference can be found at www.worldbank.org/prspreview. 
5 World Bank Operations Evaluation Department (2004), “The Poverty Reduction Strategy Initiative: An 
Independent Evaluation of the World Bank’s Support Through 2003,” World Bank, Washington, D.C; and 
International Monetary Fund – Independent Evaluation Office (2004): “Report on the Evaluation of Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility”, IMF, Washington, D.C.   7
 
A more telling criticism is that most PRSPs, the papers that support the PRSs, “deal primarily 
with the composition of public expenditure and give inadequate treatment to growth and other 
poverty-reducing actions.”  However, given that a country had to produce a PRSP in order to 
obtain debt relief and/or concessional financing, this reality is not surprising because it is much 
easier for a government to outline how it will spend its money than devise a full-blown growth 
strategy, including policy and institutional reforms, the results of which will depend a great deal 
on how other actors react to them. 
 
A common complaint against PRSPs—also noted in the OED Report—is that they include just 
about everything desirable in a developmental plan without much prioritization.  In particular, as 
stressed in the Bank-Fund 2004 Progress in Implementation report, where PRSs are not tightly 
linked to strong budget processes—the situation in most countries—prioritization is largely 
absent.  Finally, both the OED Report and the World Bank and IMF 2004 Progress Report have 
stressed the need for better data and analytic capacities to evaluate the effects of policies and 
programs on poverty reduction. 
 
These reports also point to several positive developments arising from the PRS initiative, namely 
that it has led to a greater focus on poverty in the countries and the Bank.  In exposing the need 
for better data and analysis, it has led to important advances in many countries with respect to 
data collection and the increasing use of new analytic tools - especially poverty and social impact 
assessments (PSIA).  The PRS process has also opened up new spaces for dialogue between 
different sectors and stakeholders.  The effectiveness of participation is perhaps the area of least 
consensus in the evaluations, a situation mirrored in the external critiques discussed below.  The 
2004 Progress in Implementation report sums up the situation: “While the PRS approach has 
opened space for a broader range of stakeholders to engage in discussions related to poverty 
reduction and development decisions, experience across countries has been mixed. Participatory 
processes have been most successful when national ownership and commitment to accountability 
is strong. The underlying processes have prompted greater awareness of the value of civil society 
contributions to the policy dialogue.”  WB/IMF (2004, 18) 
 
A comprehensive review of the PRS approach was conducted for the Annual Meetings of the 
World Bank and IMF in September 2005, and its findings with respect to participatory 
governance and domestic accountability form the basis for this paper.
6 
 
The review examines the PRS process under the lens of “balancing of mutual accountabilities”, 
namely the extent to which the process has (or has not) helped, on the one hand, establish a more 
balanced relationship between donors and countries, and on the other, within the countries, 
increase the accountability of governments to their constituents, and to the poor in particular.  
The review finds that the core PRS principles provide a useful framework for translating mutual 
accountability into concrete terms, and for targeting the achievement of development results at 
the country level.  Putting the country at the center of the development process has focused 
attention more squarely on poverty reduction and on the need to address country-specific 
constraints to development. A recurrent feature is the need to address pressing development 
                                                 
6 2005 PRS Review: Balancing Accountabilities and Scaling Up Results. The World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund. September 2005.     8
issues in an environment of weak institutions, imprecise rules of the game, and limited 
opportunity for contestability.  In many countries, the PRS approach has helped strengthen 
policy processes and systems, particularly those which focus on: setting goals and targets that are 
linked to public action; improving budget and monitoring systems; opening the space for 
discussing national priorities and policies for poverty reduction and growth; filling country-
specific analytic gaps; and aligning and harmonizing donor assistance with national priorities.  
The Review, however, also concludes that the PRS approach cannot compensate for generalized 
policy failures, poor governance, or underdeveloped systems for civil society engagement. Nor 
can it ensure harmonized donor responses to development priorities established by client 
countries.  
 
External Critiques of PRS Processes.  There have also been numerous external studies of PRSs 
in general and at the country level.  While they echo the critiques of the reviews undertaken by 
the IFIs—lack of prioritization, not enough focus on growth, limited results in weaker countries, 
lack of data—much more emphasis is devoted to participation and ownership issues.
7   
 
The spectrum of views is broad, ranging from a very negative assessment of the impact of the 
PRS process on the power relations between IFIs and borrowing countries (for instance, CIDSE, 
2004
8), to more positive appraisals of country experiences (for instance Bwalya et al.(2004)) are 
largely positive on participation in Malawi and Zambia, as is Booth (2002) in an earlier 8 
country study).  Concerns in this area tend to relate more to the need to institutionalize 
participatory processes (Tembo 2005, 32) and strengthen the analytic capabilities of civil society 
and Parliaments (Tembo 2005, 45) (Levinsohn 2003, 9).  Oxfam notes that “In response to the 
question whether the PRSP represented the most open policy dialogue in their country to date, 
the uniform response from Oxfam offices and civil-society partners in virtually every country 
was a clear yes.” (Oxfam, 2004: 6). 
 
The main weaknesses of PRS processes, according to external assessments, lie in their 
dissonance with countries’ political systems and realities.  While some see PRSPs as not very 
different from SAPs or national development plans (Hermele 2005, 9) (Craig 2003, 55) (Vos and 
Cabezas 2005, 5), others are concerned with the lack of priority setting (Levinsohn 2003, 10), 
and in almost all evaluations there are serious questions about the underlying politics.  Much of 
what is recommended in PRSPs, for example, is not new but it was ineffective or not properly 
implemented in the past.  What is new about PRS processes that will help overcome the political 
economy issues?  As Piron and Evans (2004, 5) note: 
 
“The PRSP principles demand that government legitimacy be redirected towards poverty 
reduction, greater responsiveness to the poor and building a more effective state—goals which 
may not have short-term political appeal.” 
 
In fact, it is important that PRS processes do not bypass existing political systems, but help to 
change how they function.  In this regard, Piron and Evans (2004, 1) state: 
                                                 
7 In addition to the numerous analyses of the PRSP carried out by civil society organizations (CSOs) and reflected in 
Bank reviews, the Bank organized two large policy conferences in January 2002 and April 2005 to enable thirty and 
one hundred CSOs respectively to share perspectives and suggestions for strengthening the PRS process.  
8 CIDSE (Sept. 2004) “PRSP as Theater – Backstage Policy Making and the Future of the PRSP Approach”.   9
 
“The PRSP approach will either engender new relationships and dynamic processes within 
countries, which will result in poverty policies being handled in new and more effective ways, or 
it will not.” 
 
Others have highlighted the intrinsically political context of the PRS approach. Norton (2002) 
remarks that success of the PRS approach rests on several crucial ‘gambles’ including: (i) that it 
will be easier to hold governments to account if they are obliged to discuss poverty and what 
they are going to do about it with their citizens; and (ii) that if donors and countries take the PRS 
process seriously, this will change the emphasis towards (political) accountability to citizens 
over (technocratic) accountability to donors. BMZ (2002: 2) observes that “PRSPs have a 
profound effect on political processes.” Booth (2003: 137) notes that PRS approach “will work 
through the political systems…of countries concerned, or it will not work at all.” 
 
II – Participation, Governance and Political Systems in the PRS Countries 
 
Country ownership and participation are central to the PRS approach. The first core principle of 
the PRS approach was that it be country-driven and owned, based on broad-based participatory 
processes.
9 Yet, as noted above, these concepts have often remained open to interpretation. 
While there are rich definitions and a robust literature underpinning these concepts, their use as 
short hand notation at times obscures the complexity of the concepts and can lead to a range of 
problems and unrealistic expectations by different stakeholders.
10  
 
While the Bank and the Fund have spoken largely in the language of country ownership and 
participation, some early observers highlighted the fact that strengthening ownership and 




12 is defined by the Bank as the process through which stakeholders (those affected 
by the outcome of reform or capable of affecting the reform) influence or share control over 
setting priorities, making policy, allocating resources, and ensuring access to public goods and 
services.  Stakeholders are generally thought to include, not only the NGO community, but also 
parliaments, unions, religious organizations, and representatives of vulnerable groups. The Bank 
acknowledges that complex policy and institutional reforms can only be adopted and 
                                                 
9 IMF/World Bank (1999b). 
10 OED (2004) emphasized the disparate perceptions of different stakeholders. Some have argued that the Bank, and 
Fund need to establish standards for a participatory process in a country, for example Herz and Embrahim (2005: 
43), although the Boards have provided explicit instructions to the contrary. Others indicate that a participatory 
process can only be successful if CSO views are reflected in the final document, CIDSE-CARITAS (2004: 45) or if 
a rights-based approach is used, World Vision (2005: 10).   
11 See, for example, Whaites (2000). Links between participation and domestic accountability have also been raised 
in various recent World Development Reports including the 1997 WDR, The State in a Changing World and the 
WDR 2003, Sustainable Development in a Dynamic World. The 2004 WDR, Making Services Work for Poor 
People, developed an analytical framework built around the notion that improving service delivery requires 
strengthening the relationships of accountability between policymakers. However, within the context of reporting on 
progress in PRS implementation, the link to accountability has been largely implicit rather than explicit. 
12 Operations Policy 8.60 – Good Practice Note.  See also World Bank (2002) Ä Sourcebook for Poverty Reduction 
Strategies”.   10
implemented if they have sufficient political support within the country. A well-implemented 
stakeholder participation strategy can develop this support and improve the quality of reform 
programs in a variety of ways including building: (i) coalitions for change; (ii) ownership; (iii) 
sustainability; (iv) effectiveness; and (v) accountability.  
 
There are three levels at which countries can institutionalize participatory mechanisms.  First, 
according to Ackerman 
13, they can be built into the strategic plans of government agencies 
reinforced by rules and procedures which mandate front-line bureaucrats (those to interface 
directly with citizens) to consult or otherwise engage with societal groups. Second, specific 
government agencies can be created with the mandate to assure societal participation in 
governmental activities or to act as a liaison with societal actors. Third, participatory 
mechanisms can be inscribed in law, requiring individual agencies or the government as a whole 
to involve societal actors at specific junctures in the public policy process.  
Keeping these considerations in mind, in this section we review existing evidence of the features 
of participatory approaches as they have developed in PRS countries.  We begin with a brief 
recapitulation of the existing political and governance realities in PRS countries (section II A).  
We then offer a brief macro overview of participation across countries (II B), and finally move to 
a detailed examination of country experiences through a simple framework of analysis (section II 
C). 
II. A - A Snapshot of Political System Realities in PRS Countries.   
Before discussing PRS participation experiences in detail, it is useful to recall a few facts 
regarding the existing systems of governance and political participation in these countries in 
order to put recent experience in perspective.  As discussed above, the PRS can best help focus 
policies on poverty if it is consonant with domestic political systems. Fundamental to facilitating 
participation are the state policy and practice on governance, rule of law, respect for human 
rights, freedom of expression and association, corruption, defense expenditure, and conflict.   
The prevailing governance environment in most PRS countries suggests that implementation of 
the approach presents both opportunities and challenges.  Figure 1 presents a scatter diagram of 
two often-quoted indicators of governance, namely the “control of corruption” from the 
Governance Matters Scores, and the index of political rights from the Freedom House.  Quite 
vividly—and not surprisingly, perhaps—the chart shows that the universe of countries that have 
engaged in the PRS process is overwhelmingly characterized by high levels of corruption and 
restricted freedoms for their citizens.  There are of course exceptions (the two countries in the 
“blessed” quadrant being Cape Verde and Madagascar), but overall the participatory processes 
induced by the PRS initiative have evolved in very difficult environments. Consequently, 
expectations with regard to their potential results have to be kept in perspective.  
 
                                                 
13 Ackerman. Idem. p.17.   11
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II. B - Overview of the Participatory Experiences in PRS Countries 
 
Against this difficult backdrop, we now take a look at the workings of the participation approach 
in PRS countries.  We begin with a macro look, displayed in Figure 2, at 49 countries that have 
begun such a process.  The chart shows six different indicators of a participatory approach which 
were used for the 2005 CDF Progress Report: Civil Society Involvement; Private Sector 
Involvement; Parliamentary Involvement; Stakeholder Access to Development Information; 
Coordinated Country Level Monitoring and Evaluation; and Sustainable Structure for 
Stakeholder Involvement.
14  The data is based on desk reviews of PRSP documents, as well as a 
series of in-country interviews with stakeholders.  For each indicator, the authors of the progress 
report formed a judgment as to the adequacy of the PRS process in each country, according to a 
5-point scale ranging from “Substantial” to “Absent”.  The data are then presented graphically 
for all the PRSP countries. 
 
                                                 
14 The Figure is based on data collected for the study “2005 CDF Progress Report: Enabling Country Capacity to 
Achieve Results” (The World Bank, July 2005).   12


















































The figure reveals a rather mixed picture.  Only in 10 percent of the cases is civil society 
involvement considered adequate (where NGOs provide systematic input and feedback to 
government on strategy formulation and implementation), but nowhere is it substantial.  Private 
sector involvement appears light and most likely confined to consultations during preparatory 
meetings.  Interestingly enough, however, some modest form of parliamentary involvement 
appears to be present in a majority of the countries (despite often-heard criticism to the contrary), 
and in over two-thirds of the cases permanent structures for stakeholder involvement have been 
put in place and are functioning to some degree. 
 
While the figure provides a broad picture of the “intensity” of participatory experiences, only an 
analysis of the modalities in individual countries may help us gauge the effects on the workings 
of national systems and on policy decision-making engendered by the PSR initiative.  We thus 
turn to a more detailed look of country experiences. 
 
II. C - Country Cases: Framework and Experiences 
In order to better conceptualize the features and effects of participatory activities at different 
stages of the PRS process we adopt a simple framework (illustrated in figure 3), inspired by an   13
earlier framework proposed by Eberlei.
15  Participation is assessed as it affects three conceptually 
distinct phases, namely formulation, implementation and monitoring of policies, and the policy 
impact that results.  In addition, the building blocks for successful impact of participation in all 
three phases are assumed to include an appropriate enabling environment, the existence and 
usability of appropriate tools, and the degree to which participatory processes are 
institutionalized.  Country experiences which exemplify interesting practice at different points in 
the rolling PRS formulation and implementation process are used for illustrative purposes.   
Enabling Environment¹ Tools² Institutionalization³
Influence
Formulation Bosnia Herzegovina Benin, Malawi, Mongolia Armenia, Mozambique
The Gambia, Sierra Leone Nepal, Rwanda, Zambia Senegal
Implementation 
and Monitoring Montenegro, Vietnam Albania, Cameroon, Uganda B'desh, Honduras, Nicaragua
Armenia, Mozambique Ghana, Mozambique
Policy Impact Senegal DRC, Ghana Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia
1 Reflected through political openness, strategic communications, rules of the game, access to information, and adequate capacity.
2 These include poverty and social impact analysis, public expenditure tracking surveys, citizens report cards, and service scorecards.
3 Embedding of the PRS in domestic institutional arrangements, including poverty observatories, and in the national budget process. 
 Figure 3: Participatory Governance: Selected Country Experience
 
The stylized facts are that where participatory processes are less well developed, countries 
involve a small number of national actors at the PRS formulation stage, and that participation 
tends to mean the one-time involvement of national actors in the formulation of a strategy paper, 
with little regard for the management of expectations or processes over time.  Where 
participation is embedded in the political process to a greater degree, countries use the PRS 
process purposively to broaden stakeholder engagement through participatory monitoring 
instruments and by fostering public debate around PRS priorities.  And finally, where 
participation is fully developed, stakeholder engagement is institutionalized in an ongoing cycle 
of strategy implementation and adjustment designed to maximize stakeholder input in the 
consideration of policy choices.  
Using the above framework to assess experience, encouraging evidence from participatory 
approaches to PRS formulation contrasts with uneven momentum of participation in strategy 
implementation and monitoring and, as yet, meager evidence of participation impacting policy 
decisions -where civil society dialogue with policy makers is perhaps most needed.   
 
                                                 
15 Walter Eberlei (2000) “Institutionalizing Participation in the PRSP Implementation, Monitoring and Review 
Process”.   14
Participation in Formulation of Poverty Strategies 
Enabling Environment  
All PRSP countries have engaged in some form of participatory discussions in PRS formulation.  
Country experience with PRS formulation has thus reflected, in the best cases, genuine efforts on 
the part of country authorities to establish a conducive environment for the engagement of 
stakeholders, in many cases for the first time, in a national dialogue on economic policy and 
poverty reduction.  In several cases, the process has been less than ideal.  In early formulation 
phases, the degree and quality of stakeholder participation responded to a conjunction of 
circumstances determined by political structure, stability, traditions and institutional capacity.  
Bolivia, Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Niger and Uganda, for 
example, built their participatory processes on poverty reduction initiatives which pre-existed the 
PRSP. Countries which were experiencing profound structural and political change at the time of 
PRS preparation integrated civil society engagement in PRS formulation in order to connect 
citizen feedback directly to the policy level. For the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Rwanda, the PRS presented an opportunity to institutionalize dialogue with civil society as part 
of a broader nation-building effort.  Authorities in the Gambia used the PRS to create space – for 
the long term - for the consideration of civil society’s priorities by the Cabinet and the National 
Assembly. 
Involvement, and reactions of different stakeholders, have varied greatly.  In a number of 
countries civil society organizations (CSOs) have made it abundantly clear that they are 
dissatisfied when asked to react to existing programs rather than contribute to an overall 
rethinking of the government’s poverty reduction agenda. Others complain that certain policies 
underpinning the PRSP, particularly the macroeconomic framework, are not sufficiently open to 
public debate. And after PRSPs are finalized and translated into action, it has not always been 
clear how participatory processes should be institutionalized.
16  A distinct argument is also made 
on the need to deepen participation both within the executive and across branches of 
government.
17 Others have focused on the special challenges related to integration of the poorest 
people and other excluded groups into participatory processes.
18  
 
Observations of PRS formulation have led to concerns about the lack of involvement of critical 
political decision-making and representative bodies such as parliaments and local governments. 
They note that early focus on civil society engagement in PRS formulation may have drawn 
attention away from the involvement of representative bodies.
19  There is concern that bypassing 
existing processes of deliberation and creating parallel structures may undermine formal 
channels of representation. However, it is important to acknowledge that legislatures in many 
PRS countries lack the human and institutional capacities needed for effective engagement.  At 
this point, PRSPs have been formally presented to parliament in about one third of the countries 
with full PRSPs. 
 
                                                 
16 See CIDSE/CARITAS (2004: 2). 
17 See, for example, Piron and Evans (2004: 5).   
18 Venro (2005: 1). Save the Children (2004: 1). 
19 See, for example, Oxfam (2004: 7) and GTZ (2003: 27).   15
The overall trend for involvement of the business community in PRS formulation is uneven, 
reflecting government’s predominant influence over private sector development and the limited 
involvement in policy dialogue of small-scale and informal actors. 
20  There is evidence, 
however, that the momentum of private sector engagement – including small, micro and informal 
sector actors - in PRS formulation and monitoring is growing. In Burkina Faso, the private sector 
is pressing government for greater PRS attention to economic growth and business development. 
In Malawi, a coalition of private sector and civil society organizations is conducting budget 
analysis to ensure government compliance with budgetary allocations. Tanzania’s Public-Private 
Partnership for Growth and Poverty Reduction strengthens the legal, regulatory and judicial 
frameworks for private sector development through an Export Credit Guarantee Scheme. The 
partnership focuses on improving the provisions of existing micro-credit schemes and the Land 
Act. 
 
The views of poor people and other marginalized groups have not been adequately reflected in 
PRSs. This is in part because direct engagement of poor people takes more time than existing 
planning cycles allow, and empowerment of the most vulnerable members of society is 
fundamentally difficult to do. Vulnerable, marginalized, and disempowered populations 
generally have less voice, fewer assets, weaker networks, and suffer more from the effects of 
non-income poverty than the average poor person.
21 This form of powerlessness results in a 
systematic failure to include poor people in the generation of information and adjustment of 
policies and actions which affect them.
22 This, in turn, prevents policymakers’ accountability to 
citizens through the “long route” of accountability. The use of participatory poverty assessments 
for raising the visibility of poor people’s views in PRS design, such as those in The Gambia, 
Rwanda, and Uganda, go some way in addressing this issue.  From a more recent full PRS, 
Sierra Leonean authorities established Focus Groups to create the conditions for long term 
empowerment and involvement of women, youth and marginalized communities in the PRS 
process, in an explicit effort to strengthen democracy and human rights.  
 
The relative importance of different vulnerable groups will vary depending on country 
circumstances, and efforts need to be made to identify these groups and put mechanisms in place 
to capture their views and concerns.
23 However, ensuring balanced representation of poor people 
and marginalized groups remains a problem, as their concerns may not be directly addressed by 
CSOs focused on specific issues. 
  
Creating an enabling environment for participation in conflict-affected and fragile states 
presents special challenges, as transparent policymaking and attention to inequality tend to be 
                                                 
20 www.prsp-watch.de as of 7/12/2005). Online database by the Association of German development non-
governmental organizations (VENRO), maintained by the Institute of Development and Peace (INEF); case studies 
on Albania, Bolivia, Guyana, Honduras, Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Vietnam (as of 
7/12/2005). 
 
21 “Civil society must increasingly invest in grassroots-based and national-level policy monitoring and analysis, in 
order to ensure that evidence-based advocacy can be carried out and to enable the marginalized to fulfill their right 
to participate in the decisions that affect their lives.” CIDSE-Caritas International (2004: 3).  
22 Venro (2005: 1) points out that significant improvements in the PRS approach can only occur if there is 
empowerment amongst the poorest sections of the population. 
23 Kindernothilfe (2005: 4) and others stress that the views of children and youth need to be taken into account.   16
limited during and immediately following periods of violence.  While core PRS principles are 
clearly relevant in such circumstances, expectations of what can be achieved need to be tempered 
with realism, while conflicting parties build trust and a mutual desire for poverty reduction 
across the country or region.  ODI observes that “[…] peaceful conflict resolution and political 
settlements remain preconditions for greater prosperity in both countries and for the state 
regaining control over the full national territory”
24  An encouraging example of conflict-sensitive 
participation in Bosnia Herzegovina is found in Box 1. 
 
 
Box 1: Conflict-Sensitive Participation—Bosnia and Herzegovina   
The PRS participatory process in Bosnia and Herzegovina included all regions and ethnicities, and the 
strategy was reviewed and approved by the parliament. Genuine efforts were made to incorporate 
conflict-affected voices early in the process, including refugees and internally displaced persons, 
women, and single-headed households. Thematic consultations considered the rights of war veterans, the 
families of fallen soldiers, missing persons and military personnel disabled in the war, refugee return, 
corruption, human rights, unemployment, and rural poverty.  Consequently, NGOs rated the process as 
highly participatory, and one which they committed to remain engaged with over time through 
monitoring. The PRSP Coordinator’s office stated: “The Government was able to learn more about the 
problems faced by the most vulnerable categories of the population, while on the other hand, civil 




Again, a crucial component of participation was the extent to which communications were used 
strategically to engage conflict-affected populations in the PRS process. The strategies of some 
countries helped to manage expectations, promote stability, and mitigate a recurrence of 
violence. The Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, and Rwanda strategies, for example, approached 
the PRS as a vehicle for social cohesion. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, the 
authorities promoted participation of marginalized and war-affected groups through print and 
radio media. Experience from other conflict-affected and fragile states, however, reflects limited 
effort to provide PRS documentation in languages other than English,
25 including ethnic minority 




Participatory mechanisms, including participatory poverty assessments, poverty and social 
impact analysis (PSIA), and participatory budgeting tools, have been developed to promote the 
inclusion of citizen input into initial PRS formulation andpoverty diagnostics, as well as periodic 
feedback into PRS assessments.  Examples from early PRSs include Malawi’s Qualitative 
Impact Monitoring of the Poverty Alleviation Policies and Programmes (QUIM) instrument, the 
participatory tools developed for Tanzania’s Coalition on Debt and Development, and the 
instruments under development in Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua.  Examples from more 
recent strategies include the multi-stakeholder impact monitoring systems designed to support 
PRS implementation in Benin, Ethiopia and Kenya.  In Nepal, quarterly work programs of 
Village and District Development Committees are posted in hard copy for public review, whilst 
                                                 
24 ODI: Politics and the PRSP Approach: Synthesis Paper (2004: 3). 
25 Some PRSPs were presented in French, Spanish, or Portuguese. 
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expenditure information is also posted on the internet to encourage citizen feedback on service 
delivery.   
 
More generally, a lesson emerging from several country experiences is that the effective 
engagement of stakeholders in the PRS is also heavily dependent on the availability of and 
access to information (Box 2).   
 
 
The PRS formulation process has provided an impetus for improving poverty information and 
knowledge bases through direct input from poor populations.  Technical and capacity challenges 
remain, however, in linking diagnostic results about who is poor and why they are poor with the 
determination of priority public actions.
26  In West and Central Africa, the Bank has supported 
poverty assessments in 20 out of 26 countries. In many of these cases, these reports were 
prepared jointly with national statistical offices or PRS units, and include the perceptions of 
poverty and priorities of poor people. In Europe and Central Asia, the Bank has adopted a 
programmatic approach to poverty assessments, in order to enhance the policy relevance of 
poverty analysis and monitoring.
27  
 
The use of ex-ante PSIA has become more common to help inform and foster national policy 
debate on reform options and support evidence-based, transparent policy making. This approach 
works best when applied to well-defined reforms rather than to broad strategies where 
distributional outcomes are difficult to assess. Data limitations, methodological issues, and 
national capacity constraints also necessitate gradual progress.
28  While there is room for 
improvement with the integration of PSIA analysis into the PRS, the approach is being used to 
inform the design of PRS-related policies. The Mongolia Utility PSIA results, for example, were 
                                                 
26 IMF/World Bank (2002b: 29-33). 
27 This approach, being applied in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Serbia 
and Montenegro, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, involves tailoring the poverty work to country-specific needs, 
developing a three-year program of poverty work, integrating capacity building and use of local consultants. The 
approach recognizes that effective poverty analysis needs to be anchored in local institutions with input from 
citizens, and that this is best facilitated through an approach that builds local capacity and feeds into the 
policymaking process in the country. 
28 IMF/World Bank (2003a:12-13), IMF/World Bank (2004: 25-28). 
Box 2: Strategic Communications in the PRS 
  
A good example of the importance of strategic communications is provided by Cambodia.  Communication 
processes in the Cambodia PRS were problematic during the formulation phase, but have experienced a marked 
improvement during implementation and revisions to the PRS. Government explicitly requested direct feedback 
from CSOs on the implementation phase, and consultations have resulted in regular dialogue with the general 
population.  A strategic approach to communication has also been instrumental in building coalitions across 
CSOs which collaborate on PRS issues. In Tanzania, simplified booklets in Kiswahili and English entitled 
“Tanzania without Poverty” were serialized in local newspapers generated lively popular interest in PRS goals 
and its relevance for the lives of individual citizens. In Rwanda, soap operas are used to ensure the ongoing 
engagement of the general public in the latest developments in PRS implementation. Whilst only accessible to 32 
percent of the population, the soap operas have been reinforced by additional coverage in local newspapers and 
monthly PRS update sheets published by NGOs. Simplified or local language versions of the PRSP were 
produced in Ghana and Vietnam and Yemen for stakeholders with limited knowledge of the country’s poverty 
reduction plans, and efforts are ongoing to sustain feedback from these groups.   18
presented on national television, and citizen feedback directly influenced the design of tariff 
reforms. In Zambia, a proposal by the Ministry of Land to convert the country’s 94 percent of 
land under customary tenure into state-owned land was analyzed, leading to a decision to cancel 
the proposed reform. In Rwanda, a broad-based team working on the PSIA in the tea sector 
advised the Ministry of Agriculture to introduce a differentiated tea pricing policy, which would 
increase productivity and returns to laborers. Once the proposal was adopted, they also advised 




There is little doubt that greater coherence between government-led consultations and 
independent participatory methods can enhance the relevance of policy making and related 
responses.  However, institutionalizing a system of regular exchange between stakeholders and 
the policy level remains one of the more challenging features of the PRS.  Based on longer 
experience, some countries have merged top-down and bottom-up mechanisms underpinning 
PRS formulation and adjustment.  In Armenia, for example, a Public Partnership Agreement 
reflecting co-ownership of the PRS was signed by Government and representatives of the 
National Assembly, Armenian Apostolic Church, trade unions, local self-governance bodies, 
employers and entrepreneurs and NGOs. The agreement builds upon commitment to 
implementation of PRS priorities for the coming three years.  The Armenian Government further 
created a PRS Steering Committee, Working Group and Open Forum, each with designated 
responsibilities for PRS re-formulation, monitoring and implementation. The Open Forum is 
specifically charged with ensuring public awareness of PRS adjustment and results. It is also 
designated as stakeholders’ feedback mechanism to the policy level. Other examples of 
institutionalization include Mozambique and Senegal, where Poverty Observatories have been 
established to encourage joint official and independent design and oversight of their PRSs.  
Stakeholders in these countries – including government officials, civil society groups, religious 
bodies, business leaders, trade unions, NGOs and external partners - conduct a comprehensive 
review of PRS progress which Government to assess poverty outcomes.  
 
 




Integration of participatory processes in PRS implementation and monitoring presents a mixed 
picture.
29  The PRS has generally prompted governments to become become more aware that 
their policy choices and expenditure allocations are subject to increasing scrutiny from citizens, 
parliament, community organizations, social partners, media organizations and external partners.  
They also recognize that inclusion is an important pillar of good governance, and that citizens are 
eager to monitor whether the leadership is listening to their concerns.  At the same time, limited 
progress can be seen with respect to the rooting of ownership, coalition building and 
                                                 
29 A major review of monitoring systems in PRSP countries is provided in Tara Bedi et. al. “Monitoring Systems for 
Poverty Reduction Strategies:  An Analysis of Institutional Arrangements” World Bank, forthcoming, December 
2005.   19
accountability mechanisms between governments and civil society to ensure sustainability and 
the effective monitoring of results.  
 
The Government of Vietnam introduced a PRS Roll-Out Program to promote pro-poor 
participation at commune and village levels by using a bottom-up planning and budgeting 
system. The Roll-Out is designed to target rural poverty and to meet local governance objectives 
of the Grassroots Democracy Decree. Donors also use the model in an effort to harmonize their 
respective programs. The Ministry of Labor, War Invalids, and Social Affairs is integrating its 
funds as block grants into the Commune Development Funds.  Preliminary feedback from poor 
people in rural areas indicates improvements in satisfaction levels with the prioritization of their 
needs in local planning.  Box 3 provides another example of how the authorities in Montenegro 
successfully sought out and enabled vulnerable communities to engage with the PRS process. 
 
Box 3: Reaching Vulnerable Communities in Montenegro 
Analytical work conducted by Montenegro’s Center for Enterprise and Economic Development provides a good 
example of how poverty analysis and tracking indicators addressed the concerns of the Roma community. The work 
also focused on other vulnerable groups: internally-displaced populations (IDPs) and refugees from the wars in 
Bosnia and Kosovo. As a result, several important decisions were made. First, a national action plan for Roma 
inclusion was developed and supported by the parliament in early 2005. With the support of UNDP, a strong 
advocacy network was mobilized that was instrumental in securing broad support. Second, the authorities 
established a commission headed by the Minister of Labor and Social Welfare to develop and implement a national 
strategy for resolving the problems of refugees and internally displaced persons. This strategy, which includes 
concrete steps (such as amendments to the labor law and changes to social programs) was adopted in early 2005, and 
its implementation has started with active involvement of local NGOs. Both strategies are integrated in the PRS 
framework and their implementation is monitored as part of the PRS implementation.   
 
In Cameroon, Kenya, Mauritania and Senegal, the PRS process included the preparation of a 
legal framework to guarantee rights and design targeted programs for disabled, elderly, refugees, 
and displaced populations. The Senegalese monitoring system places special emphasis on 





PRS implementation experience shows a wide array of participatory monitoring tools, including 
public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS), scorecards and report cards, which have been 
developed to include citizen feedback into periodic PRS assessments. Stakeholder feedback on 
these instruments conveys civil society’s increased ownership of poverty reduction goals, which 
will need to be supported and improved over time (Box 4). Questions with regard to the 
legitimacy of civil society organization’s representation of citizens can be addressed by building 
the economic literacy of these organizations, and by supporting their efforts to build coalitions 
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Box 4: Participatory Monitoring Mechanisms at Work 
Albania’s 2003 education sector budget allocation, for example, was increased as a result of dialogue between CSOs 
and parliament, which was followed by successful lobbying by parliament with the executive branch. CSOs action 
in Albania has also resulted in the institutionalization of participatory methodologies in the budget guidelines of 
communes and municipalities, and the development of a citizen’s budget manual and toolkits for local governments. 
Armenia’s PRSP Social Monitoring and Analysis System contains measures for collaboration in PRS 
implementation and monitoring, which explicitly involve central and local government, as well as community 
councils, NGOs, unions, business associations, religious organizations, vulnerable groups, television and written 
media.   
Cameroon’s Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation of PRS Implementation. This special mechanism for the 
management and the monitoring of the use of HIPC funds by CSOs results in an unprecedented  level of access to 
information by civil society. On-the-job capacity building has had a direct impact on the quality of CSO feedback on 
the process; and their ability to use independent analysis tools for monitoring national budget execution. CSOs are 
also empowered to conduct dialogue with government officials and donors on programming, budgeting and 
monitoring of poverty oriented developments.  
Malawi’s Qualitative Impact Monitoring system using participatory methods was established in partnership between 
the government and other stakeholders to keep policymakers informed about progress in implementing and 
assessing PRS impact. In the formulation phase, the following benchmarks were identified: PRSP was examined to 
assess poverty content based on previously identified priorities of the poor and on Vision 2020. Various 
macroeconomic policies were analyzed to determine their consistency with these poverty priorities. Key outcome 
indicators of the PRS were identified, and progress towards achieving them is measured in consultation with the 
poor. The information generated is fed back into the policy process in the form of recommendations on improving 
the poverty focus of selected policies. 
 
Uganda’s emphasis on M&E has resulted in the mobilization of government departments and civil society 
stakeholders and the arrangements have produced tangible results. The Budget Directorate of the Ministry of 
Finance provides regular information on budget disbursements to CSOs for review. CSOs and parent associations 
collaborate at the district level, using PETs tools, to track budget implementation. CSOs provide independent reports 






Benin’s National Commission for Development and Fight against Poverty, Cameroon’s National 
Poverty Reduction Network, Kenya’s National Economic and Social Council, Tanzania’s 
Consultation Guidelines for the PRSP Review (Box 5) are examples of arrangements established 
to institutionalize partnership, information exchange and joint monitoring of progress with PRS 
implementation.  
 
Despite the mixed record from 1999 to 2005, there has been an upward trend in the 
institutionalization of parliaments’ oversight of PRS implementation. Several PRSs highlight 
parliament’s role, either through a PRS standing committee (e.g., Azerbaijan, Ghana), other 
standing committees (e.g., budget committees), or through membership of PRS Steering 
Committees managed by the executive branch (e.g., Chad and Georgia). The parliaments of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ethiopia are implementing changes to make legislative oversight of 
the PRS a permanent activity. Many governments report to parliaments on budget and PRS 
progress (e.g., Benin, Kyrgyz Republic, Mozambique, and Tajikistan).  Parliaments are also   21
increasing their ability to contribute to PRS prioritization, costing, policy coordination, and 
monitoring of poverty outcomes.
30 Capacity building efforts that support PRS monitoring, 
including the link to the MTEF and budget, have resulted in more targeted policy 
recommendations on the PRS to the executive branch (e.g., Burkina Faso and Cameroon). 
Regular engagement with constituents through outreach activities and public hearings can also 
improve the quality of feedback to policymakers (e.g., Rwanda and Tanzania). Other observers 
have noted that strengthening links between active civil society groups and parliaments could 
help create a common platform to support pro-poor priorities.
31 With support from parliamentary 
associations worldwide, including the Parliamentary Network of the World Bank (PNoWB), 
informal networks have been formed in East Africa, the Middle East, and Latin American to 
strengthen parliaments’ abilities to engage in country-level PRS processes.   
 
Box 5:  Participation in PRS Implementation and Review—Tanzania 
The most recent PRSP Annual Progress Report establishes “Consultation Guidelines for the PRSP Review” which 
stipulate that ongoing adjustment of PRS documents should provide for:  
  Ample timeline for consultations 
  Transparent planning of participation processes 
  Expanded consultations across government agencies 
  Leadership of consultations to be shared between government and domestic stakeholders 
  Stakeholder participation to explicitly include business associations and the labor movement 
  Expanded methods for engagement with civil society, including townhall meetings, radio programs, popular 
drama presentations, and television broadcasts 
  Systematic analysis of civil society feedback and integration of key issues into the next PRS. 
 
 
Decentralization policies designed to harness citizens’ attention on transparency in local 
expenditures and reinforce pro-poor service delivery are slowly helping to institutionalize PRS 
ownership across populations and local governments in implementation and monitoring phases.  
Such initiatives are leading to the development of social capital in communities, in addition to 
greater efficiency and impact in the use of resources at the local level. The Bangladesh 
Government, for example, allocates matching grants to local governments to enhance prospects 
for quality and accountability in public service delivery.  In Ghana, a framework has been 
developed to enable District Assemblies to prepare their own Medium-Term Development Plans, 
using the PRS format and principles, and the determination of poverty reduction priorities by 
local communities.  
 
There is evidence of stronger local community participation in the monitoring and ongoing 
adjustment of PRS goals.  In Honduras, the Local Development and Decentralization Program 
(PRODEL) uses mechanisms for ensuring municipal, local consortia, NGO and community 
organization inputs in the design and implementation of Strategic Plans for Municipal 
Development (PEDMs) in the country’s 298 municipalities.  Nicaragua’s PASE System for the 
Coordination, Implementation, Monitoring and Assessment of the Economic Growth and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (ERCERP) and the National Development Plan supports the de-
                                                 
30 Draman and Langdon (2005: 16). 
31 Parliamentary Centre (2005: 2, 6). This type of approach is beginningg to emerge, for example, in Malawi and 
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concentration of resource management and investment decisions to regional and departmental 
levels, where associations of municipalities, development councils, NGOs, private entrepreneurs, 
and civil society groups identify and design locally-driven programs and projects.  Space has 
been opened for social accountability audits by civil society, and a pre-investment fund for 
project identification and design.  Preliminary outcomes include the building of public-private 
coalitions for negotiating local resource allocation with central government, and more efficient 
use of the Fund for Social and Productive Investments.  Rwanda’s Ubudehe process
32 informs 
district level planning decisions and is reflected in aggregate plans at the national level.   
 




It is generally accepted that the ultimate test of participatory governance is whether a national 
policy dialogue leads to more flexibility in carrying out national development policies, making 
them more inclusive and tailored to country circumstances.  Calls for an expansion of policy 
space, particularly with regard to macroeconomic policy, as well as the use of Poverty and Social 
Impact Analysis (PSIA) to help inform decisions, has become an important element in the policy 
dialogue among governments, civil society and external partners. In the Sub-Saharan Africa 
context in particular, initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
attribute increasing importance to good governance and transparency, which reinforces the 




PSIA has helped to support informed policy debate by creating opportunities for exploring 
conflicting hypotheses and being transparent about assumptions.  While it is not a panacea, there 
are cases where the PSIA process has created space where stakeholders can raise concerns.  For 
example, in Ghana, an energy sector PSIA resulted in a process that helped to dispel common 
misperceptions about utility reforms by examining the impact on the poor and taking those 
impacts and stakeholder views into account. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, a mining 
sector PSIA raised awareness about the likely negative impacts of mine closure due to reductions 
in social services that the mines supplied. The PSIA identified vulnerable groups who would 
suffer most from reform that would entail shutting down schools and health stations. The PSIA 
resulted in 40,000 children being kept in school by putting in place a short-term assistance 
program to keep schools open providing more time to develop a sustainable, long-term solution. 
 
The need to pursue the opening of more macroeconomic policy space in the participatory process 
figures prominently in the views of civil society stakeholders. Many observers believe that open 
debate on what macroeconomic framework is most suited to reduce poverty is still lacking as a 
systematic part of the PRS process.
33  Some civil society groups believe that the opportunity to 
participate in their government’s economic policy making carries no weight because the policy 
space enjoyed by governments is so limited as to prevent any effective policy debate among 
                                                 
32 A grassroots approach used to identify and prioritize local development initiatives. 
33 Cordaid, Novib and Wemos (2005: 2).   23
different groups.
34  Past implementation progress reports by Band and IMF staff, and the 2004 
IEO evaluation of the PRS approach also concluded that the PRS process has had a limited 
impact in generating discussions of alternative policy options with respect to the macroeconomic 
framework and related structural reforms.
35 
 
There may be several reasons why macroeconomic policy options have not been discussed more 
broadly in the PRS process.  In some instances, macroeconomic policy decisions, (e.g., on the 
level of exchange rates or interest rates) are by their nature sensitive and cannot be made in a 
process of broad public debate. This is the case even in OECD countries.  In other cases, 
governments are reluctant to discuss macroeconomic policy options in a broader public forum, as 
they consider this may slow decision-making and complicate relations with donors. The 
institutional framework may also not be conducive to such discussions,
 36 and the necessary 
information may not be available on a timely basis and in accessible form. Many potential 
participants in such discussions also lack the technical and institutional capacity to evaluate 





Despite the many challenges, there are some indications that the PRS is helping make 
headway towards greater participation and domestic accountability.  In Zambia, for example, a 
network of civil society groups, formed in 2000 for coordinating civil society input into the PRS 
process, has collaborated with the government to develop a participatory framework into the 
Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) network. The network includes over sixty NGOs, 
trade unions, and church groups, many of which also campaigned on the “third term issue,” from 
which they gained added legitimacy and voice. As Besinati Mpepo, a coordinator for the 
network, explains: “If civil society is effectively organized and mobilized on national issues, 
government can take it seriously. This has been the case with the debt campaign, the campaigns 
against the third term of Zambia’s second republican president…and civil society input to the 
PRSP…”
38 Since the completion of the PRS consultation process, CSPR has also played an 
active role in monitoring implementation—particularly in conducting participatory poverty 
                                                 
34 CIDSE-Caritas Internationalis (2005a: 6, 38). Some recognize, however, that this opportunity itself depends on 
the PRS process pursued by the government, which may be deficient and is often exacerbated by lack of 
transparency, institutional fragmentation, and widespread off-budget funding. See Water Aid (2005: 10). 
35 IMF/World Bank (2004: 19), and IEO (2004: 72, 111). The IEO report expressed doubts that PRGF program 
design had been guided by the PRSPs—in fact, the opposite influence has been more common. By contrast, Timor 
Leste provides an example where government encouraged broad-based consultations before adopting its petroleum 
savings policy which sets aside the bulk of petroleum revenues for future generations. Since effective 
implementation depends critically on its continued implementation by successive governments, the government 
considered it important to build popular consensus for the policy. 
36 The Fund’s outreach and public activities in-country must take place within this framework. Fund staff should 
encourage a government to open up the debate on macroeconomic policy issues, as this will promote better 
understanding and acceptance of the policies ultimately decided, and enhance the chances for their successful 
implementation. However, the Fund cannot organize a public debate of policies against the government’s wishes. 
See IMF (2003b).  
37 There is some debate on whether the IFI staffs should themselves propose alternative policy options, or merely be 
willing to discuss the proposals of others on their merits. Alternative proposals by the staffs of the Fund and the 
Bank could run the risk of filling, at least partially, the policy space that should be left to the country authorities. 
38 Mpepo (2003).   24
monitoring and expenditure tracking—although capacity remains a constraint.  The robustness of 
civil society participation is a promising aspect of Zambia’s PRS process. As a next step, to 
solidify domestic ownership and keep poverty reduction firmly on the national agenda, there is a 
need for civil society to build bridges to civil servants, political parties, and the parliament as a 
whole.  This is a case where a process that was viewed initially as externally imposed has gained 
domestic currency. It shows how effective participation can help rebalance an external focus 
towards a domestic one. It also shows the importance of understanding the political economy 
factors that determine how a PRS process unfolds. 
 
In Mozambique, evidence suggests that efforts to institutionalize stakeholder participation have 
also taken root. The Second Poverty Observatory in April 2004 (first mentioned in section II. C 
above), including representatives from the private sector, civil society, and a broad spectrum of 
public entities, assessed PRS implementation progress in key sectors. Civil society also 
participated actively in the preparation of a second PRS.  As part of the consultation process, 
Government involved the private sector in consultations on procurement reform and, ensured the 
participation of the private sector and trade unions in revisions to labor laws.  
 
With respect to stakeholder dialogue on macroeconomic issues, there are some recent examples 
of more flexible discussions between government officials and IMF staff on key issues during 
the development and implementation of the PRS. In some countries with more advanced PRS 
processes (e.g., Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Tanzania), there have been discussions around 
setting alternative targets for real growth, inflation, current account, and revenue and expenditure 
that are consistent with the objectives of macroeconomic stability and poverty reduction. There 
have also been discussions of the trade-offs between the possibly adverse macroeconomic effects 
of higher-than-projected externally financed spending and its poverty-reducing impact in 
Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda. However, these debates on 
policy options continue to be largely limited to a narrow circle of officials directly involved in 
macroeconomic programming and the negotiations with development partners, with relatively 
little direct involvement of the public.  
 
III. Early Results – Is There Evidence of Impact? 
 
In the previous section we have reviewed several country examples of participation in the PRS 
cycle at different stages that are likely to have an effect on the way in which the citizenry, in its 
various organizational forms, can affect the conduct of policies.  But assessing the overall effect 
of the several country experiences is extremely difficult in the absence of counterfactuals, as well 
as given the short time which has elapsed in most countries undergoing a PRS process.  In this 
section we therefore present aggregate evidence with respect to the evolution of a number of 
indicators of good governance, which are presumably likely to be affected by successful 
participatory processes.  The discussion is only heuristic, as there are obviously several 
concurrent factors that can affect governance outcomes.  But we think it is still interesting to see 
how trends have evolved in this group of countries. 
 
We have discussed in section 2 the poor governance environment prevailing in a majority of PRS 
countries.  This is confirmed by figure 4, which displays the World Bank’s Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) scores, policy performance in all groups of low-income   25
countries—those that are not heavily indebted (LIC non-Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
[HIPC]), those that are heavily indebted and had reached decision or completion point by June 
2005 (HIPC-1) and those that had not reached decision point by that time (HIPC-0).  As the 
figure shows, all of these groups scored below that of middle-income countries.  
 
The good news is that over the past five years of PRS implementation, gains in policy 
performance by those low-income countries that had reached the decision or completion point 
under the HIPC Initiative substantially outpaced that in middle-income and other low-income 
countries (figure 5). By 2004, the institutional and policy environment in heavily-indebted poor 
countries that had reached decision or completion points matched (or was slightly stronger than) 
that in low-income countries that were not heavily-indebted (figure 6). The heightened attention 
which the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative placed on improved institutions and 
policies may be responsible in part for these developments. 
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Of particular note are the strong performance gains by HIPCs on two key indicators of particular 
relevance to participatory governance: (i) the quality of budget and financial management; and 
(ii) transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector (figure 7). By 2004, 
performance on these variables by HIPCs that had reached decision or completion points had 
surpassed that of low-income countries that were not heavily-indebted. 
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Source for figures 6-7: World Bank staff calculations. 
 
The above trends are encouraging, particularly when one considers that PRSs are designed and 
implemented against a backdrop of national politics.  In some contexts, the PRS has engendered 
better intra-governmental policymaking processes, thereby improving the political environment 
on the ground.  In other cases, PRS preparation and implementation processes are rendered more 
complex because of the tradition of splitting planning and finance functions.  In relatively stable 
environments, including Bosnia Herzegovina, Rwanda, Vietnam and Uganda, for example, PRS 
consultation and participation processes have contributed to the building of national unity.  
The nature of the political system has therefore influenced the breadth and depth of stakeholder 
participation in the PRS to date. Across government too, variables include relationships and 
power structures between the executive and legislative branches of government, and whether the 
public service is meritocracy-, politically-, and/or ethnically-based.   27
Against the backdrop of such widely varying country circumstances, one can observe an opening 
of social, economic and, in some cases, political, space through the PRS process which has 
enabled more public discussion and stakeholder involvement in decision-making.  There is also 
evidence of progress in the use of mechanisms and tools designed to strengthen the rights-based, 
structurally-integrated, legitimacy- and capacity-building components of PRS formulation, 
implementation and monitoring.  What is also clear, however, is that for participation to become 
institutionalized, PRS processes need to be further integrated into state-wide systems, and 
become compatible with existing political structures.   
 
IV. Conclusions: How to Move Forward? 
 
The first five years of PRS formulation and implementation reveal that strengthening 
participatory governance is possible but is likely to require more commitment, capacity, and time 
than civil society and donor partners are willing to accept.  The viability of participation depends 
on the severity of a number of constraining factors: 
 
•  Weak governance, transparency and accountability. 
•  Participation interpreted as consultation and information exchange between authorities 
and stakeholders, with no guarantee that priorities expressed by stakeholders will be 
heeded or incorporated into policy decision-making. 
•  Exclusion of certain stakeholders from PRS processes – whether they are vulnerable 
groups, ethnic minorities, indigenous populations, women, disabled, displaced persons, 
parliament, or labor unions.  
•  Inadequate and poor quality information, coupled with weak communications strategies 
for reaching the broader public. 
•  Low level of economic literacy and management capacity across civil society 
organizations. 
 
The many advances with respect to participation in PRS countries should be recognized, while 
acknowledging that it is too early to attribute causality for improved governance environments in 
low-income countries directly to the PRS initiative.  Judged against the prevailing governance 
environment in most of these countries, it is evident that a PRS process cannot immediately 
offset the shortcomings of weak institutions, political structures, or constraints on freedom of 
expression and association.  Country efforts to reinforce progress and institutionalize 
participation in PRS formulation, implementation, and monitoring therefore need to be scaled-
up. This often calls for closer integration with existing participatory processes and representative 
bodies.  An informed policy debate can be supported by exploring conflicting hypotheses and 
making assumptions transparent, although building in-country capacity to conduct such debates 
is a process that requires time and more attention. Similarly, not all decisions can or should be 
made in public fora, but there is still considerable scope to open up space for a public discussion 
on some of the policy choices that underpin the poverty reduction strategy.  
 
Helping countries and donors to balance their respective accountabilities will likely contribute to 
improvements in participatory governance processes. For countries, good practices include 
communicating the goals of participation process upfront and providing relevant information in   28
accessible forms. Efforts should be made to embed participation within existing mechanisms, 
with due consideration to representative bodies, and strengthen these where necessary. 
Participatory monitoring tools can be helpful in institutionalizing citizen feedback into periodic 
PRSP assessments. During implementation, there is also an opportunity to broaden the 
engagement of stakeholders, such as the business community and labor movements.  
 
Development partners need to be aware of (and not bypass) participatory and representative 
processes and institutions that already exist. When such processes are weak, consideration needs 
to be given as to whether and how external assistance can contribute to improving them. 
Development partners should also encourage the country authorities to establish a conducive 
framework for open public debate on policy choices, including on macroeconomic policies.  
 
Going forward, there are encouraging signs that developing country societies can sustain 
real progress with participatory governance, with external partners playing a key supportive role 
through harmonization and alignment.   29
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